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Abstract
Background: Companies are currently marketing personal genome tests directly-to-consumer that provide genetic
susceptibility testing for a range of multifactorial diseases simultaneously. As these tests comprise multiple risk
analyses for multiple diseases, they may be difficult to evaluate. Insight into morally relevant differences between
diseases will assist researchers, healthcare professionals, policy-makers and other stakeholders in the ethical
evaluation of personal genome tests.
Discussion: In this paper, we identify and discuss four disease characteristics - severity, actionability, age of onset,
and the somatic/psychiatric nature of disease - and show how these lead to specific ethical issues. By way of
illustration, we apply this framework to genetic susceptibility testing for three diseases: type 2 diabetes, age-related
macular degeneration and clinical depression. For these three diseases, we point out the ethical issues that are
relevant to the question whether it is morally justifiable to offer genetic susceptibility testing to adults or to
children or minors, and on what conditions.
Summary: We conclude that the ethical evaluation of personal genome tests is challenging, for the ethical issues
differ with the diseases tested for. An understanding of the ethical significance of disease characteristics will
improve the ethical, legal and societal debate on personal genome testing.
Background
A growing number of personal genome testing services
are presently available that estimate genetic susceptibil-
ity to multifactorial diseases [1]. Unlike genetic tests for
monogenic diseases, susceptibility tests for multifactorial
diseases can be obtained almost exclusively on the
direct-to-consumer market. Personal genome tests are
non-targeted: they determine a person’s risk for a multi-
tude of multifactorial diseases simultaneously [2-5],
including cardiovascular disease, Alzheimer’s disease,
osteoporosis, type 2 diabetes, schizophrenia, and many
types of cancer. One of the leading personal genome
testing companies is currently estimating personal risks
for over two hundred diseases and other phenotypic
traits in one single test [2]. The large quantity of test
results will have limited clinical significance for and
varying emotional impact on consumers, which are in
part connected with differences between the diseases
tested for.
Differences between diseases may have important
implications for the ethical, legal and societal debate on
genetic susceptibility testing for multifactorial diseases
(for the remainder of this paper we will use the term
‘susceptibility testing’), whether it is offered as part of a
personal genome test or on its own, for a single disease,
whether within the clinic or on the direct-to-consumer
market. The offering, for instance, of susceptibility test-
ing for less severe diseases for which there are preven-
tive options available may be morally acceptable,
whereas the same test for severe diseases in the absence
of treatment options may not. Personal genome tests
may comprise both severe and less severe diseases and
may as a whole thus be difficult to evaluate. In recent
years, a range of ethical, legal and societal issues has
been touched upon in professional and academic discus-
sions on genetic testing, such as privacy issues, psycho-
logical impact, regulatory issues, and informed consent
[6-8]. These issues however may not arise in all suscept-
ibility tests that are offered within one personal genome
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test. Privacy issues, for example, may be more pressing
for genetic tests for psychiatric diseases than for somatic
diseases, and the psychological impact of testing may be
more serious in severe diseases than in less severe dis-
eases. With this paper, we propose a systematic
approach to the ethical evaluation of susceptibility test-
ing, which considers differences between diseases and
which explains what ethical issues are to be addressed,
on the basis of disease characteristics.
As in this paper we focus explicitly on disease character-
istics and their impact on the ethical debate, we do not
elaborate upon characteristics of the test, such as clinical
validity and clinical utility. Genetic susceptibility tests dif-
fer from presymptomatic tests for monogenic diseases:
they indicate risk rather than diagnosis and are generally
of limited to moderate clinical validity and utility. Clinical
validity and utility are of paramount importance to the
ethical, legal and societal debate, but have already been
addressed elsewhere [8,9]. Test characteristics and disease
characteristics, however, are not entirely separable and
may interact with one another as well as among them-
selves, as will be pointed out in the discussion.
The ethical debate may benefit from a better under-
standing of morally relevant differences between diseases.
For national health care systems, policy-makers, health-
care professionals, physicians, companies or other stake-
holders who are considering the offering or the
regulation of susceptibility testing, it is important to be
aware of differences between diseases or types of diseases,
because susceptibility tests for different diseases may be
connected with different ethical issues and may warrant
different ethical evaluations. This poses challenges to an
industry that is increasingly offering personal genome
tests that consist of more and more susceptibility tests
for more and more diseases rather than single suscept-
ibility tests for single diseases. The insights offered in this
paper are also anticipatory of future developments, and
apply equally to susceptibility testing based on array tech-
nologies and to susceptibility testing based on exome or
whole-genome sequencing technologies.
First, we will present and discuss a list of key disease
characteristics that are crucial to the ethical appraisal of
genetic susceptibility testing for multifactorial diseases.
Then we will discuss susceptibility testing for three dis-
eases, type 2 diabetes mellitus, age-related macular
degeneration and clinical depression, and ethical issues
that must be taken into account in the evaluation of
such tests.
Discussion
1. Disease characteristics and their associated ethical
issues
We have conducted a review of the biomedical and
bioethical literature and identified three existing
normative frameworks, one for clinical genetics [10] and
two for population genetic screening programmes,
namely the Wilson and Jungner criteria [11] and the
ACCE model [12], which take into account differences
in disease characteristics and their impact on the ethical
evaluation of testing. Not all disease characteristics or
consequences of testing that are mentioned in the three
frameworks, however, are applicable to genetic suscept-
ibility testing for multifactorial diseases. For example,
while characteristics such as the prevalence of the dis-
ease [13] or the population health impact [11] are rele-
vant from a public health perspective, they are arguably
less relevant for the ethical evaluation of susceptibility
testing in individuals. Further, implications for relatives
or availability of a follow-up plan [10] have been formu-
lated in the context of clinical genetic testing for mono-
genic diseases and do not readily apply to testing for
multifactorial diseases, where test results so far have
been - and are likely to continue to be - of limited clini-
cal validity and utility.
On the basis of an ethical analysis, we have identified
four disease characteristics that are specifically relevant
to the ethical evaluation of susceptibility testing: sever-
ity, actionability, age of onset, and the distinction
between psychiatric and somatic diseases. These charac-
teristics are morally relevant because they are directly
connected with three of the four major bioethical princi-
ples: beneficence, non-maleficence and respect for
autonomy [14]. Beneficence is the medical professional’s
duty to care, to do well, and to act in patients’ interests.
The principle of non-maleficence specifies that a medi-
cal professional should refrain from doing needless
harm. Respect for a person’s autonomy implies roughly
that patients should be allowed to make their own
voluntary, informed choices with regard to their health
management. For the purposes of this paper, we leave
aside the fourth principle, that of justice, because we
focus on the justifiability of the provision of susceptibil-
ity testing to an individual rather than on societal, dis-
tributive issues that surround healthcare on a collective
level. Below, we will discuss the four characteristics and
describe how they give rise to ethical issues.
It is important to note at the outset of our discussion
that internationally recognised guidelines on the provi-
sion of genetic testing [15,16] demand that medical
supervision and genetic counselling are made available
in genetic testing. The guidelines apply to genetic test-
ing that is ‘offered in a clinical context’ [15] and genetic
testing ‘for health purposes’ [16], respectively. It is there-
fore unclear whether these guidelines apply also to
direct-to-consumer genetic testing or to genetic testing
for purposes other than health. Both guidelines do spe-
cify that the form and the extent of genetic counselling
“shall be defined according to the implications of the
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results of the test” [16] and “should be proportionate
and appropriate to the characteristics of the test, the
test limitations, the potential for harm, and the rele-
vance of test results to individuals and their relatives”
[15]. In our discussion, we will follow the idea that
counselling requirments should be proportional and
show how disease characteristics play a role in deter-
mining the appropriate level of counselling and medical
care.
1.1 Severity
Severity of a disease refers to the morbidity and mortal-
ity brought about by the disease. In clinical genetics, the
severity of the disease affects the emotional, psychologi-
cal and social impact of genetic test results. Disease
severity therefore has consequences for the ethical
requirement to offer good care (beneficence) [14] in the
form of genetic counselling and psychological support.
It is recommended that extensive pre- and post-test
genetic counselling is mandated in all cases of severe
hereditary disease [10]. One could argue that for severe
diseases, where the anticipated psychological impact and
the potential for harm are greater than for less severe
diseases, as a general rule, more information, guidance
and care are morally required.
The severity of a disease, however, is not always easy
to determine: diseases tend to express differently from
one individual to the next. High levels of phenotypic
variability may cause genetic susceptibility test results to
leave patients or consumers with substantial uncertainty
with regard to the severity as well as the onset of the
disease. These uncertainties may pose challenges for the
provision of pre- and post-test information on personal
genome testing and for its informed consent processes.
Thus, disease severity affects the ethical issues of infor-
mation, informed consent, genetic counselling, guidance
and care.
1.2 Actionability
There are potential harms involved in genetic testing,
such as health risks (e.g. unnecessary follow-up), psy-
chological risk (e.g. anxiety) and social risks (e.g. finan-
cial costs, discrimination). Therefore, in the ethical
evaluation of genetic testing and screening services, a
favorable balance between risks and benefits, i.e.
between the principles of beneficence and non-malefi-
cence, has traditionally been a central criterion [11].
The availability of therapeutic interventions constitutes
a major benefit and a rationale [9,11] for genetic testing
or screening. With part of medicine’s focus shifting
from cure to prevention over the last few decades [17],
however, the notion of treatment has come to include
other ‘meaningful actionable options’ [18], which were
added primarily to include reproductive decision-mak-
ing. The more contemporary ACCE framework intro-
duces preventive options and actions as possible benefits
of screening: it requires that there be “an effective
remedy, acceptable action, or other measurable benefit”
[12]. In the context of personal genome testing, with its
wide variety of diseases tested for, actionability has
become a more appropriate notion than treatability.
For susceptibility testing, prevention is argued to be
one of the main purposes and potential benefit [2]
[[3,17]. Prevention may indeed constitute a benefit to
both the individual and society and an argument for the
moral acceptability of susceptibility testing. It should be
noted that in order for preventive measures to be effec-
tive, compliance is essential. Compliance is generally
promoted when preventive options are simple and
morally or psychologically acceptable [19]. The daily
taking of supplementary vitamins, for example, is likely
to be accepted and carried out much more easily than
more intrusive measures, such as medication with side-
effects or a radical change of diet.
However, it is not at all clear that susceptibility testing
contributes or will contribute to the prevention of mul-
tifactorial diseases [20]. If it does not or will not, its
major rationale will lack ground, and therewith, it may
not be able to reach the morally required balance of
benefits and risks. An alternative rationale for suscept-
ibility testing and potential benefit could be the personal
utility [19] that consumers find in knowing their genetic
information. It has been found that disease risk informa-
tion obtained from a screening programme may serve
psychological or personal purposes, such as relief from
uncertainty [21], solace, the value of knowing. Whether
personal utility on its own could provide a sufficient
argument for the ethical acceptability of genetic suscept-
ibility testing or personal genome testing, is still a topic
for discussion [22].
1.3 Age of onset
Through predictive genetic testing, it has become possi-
ble for individuals to know their genetic risk before the
onset of symptoms of disease. Knowledge of genetic risk
for late-onset disease may cause anxiety and distress.
Not everyone wishes to obtain such knowledge [23].
One of the classic ethical principles within clinical
genetics is therefore the right not to know, which is
derived from respect for autonomy [24]. Especially in
children the right not to know is a recurrent issue,
because adverse psychological and social effects of pre-
dictive genetic testing for late-onset diseases may be
severe in children [25], and also because children are
considered incapable or less capable of making autono-
mous choices. It is generally agreed upon that in the
absence of medical necessity, predictive genetic testing
for late-onset diseases must be postponed until adult-
hood, when young adults have attained the ability to
make autonomous decisions [25]. Exceptions are some-
times made when the clinical geneticist finds that the
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child or adolescent has sufficient cognitive ability to par-
ticipate in decision-making and when the child’s medical
or other interests may weigh up against potential harms
[21]. In clinical genetic practice, however, children and
minors are more often refused than allowed predictive
genetic testing for late-onset diseases [26]. These ethical
principles may be equally applicable to genetic suscept-
ibility testing for late-onset multifactorial diseases in
children or minors.
The distinction between early-onset and late-onset of
disease, however, cannot be so readily made in biological
reality. In the pathogenesis of most multifactorial dis-
eases, genetic and non-genetic risk factors act and inter-
act over time to cause evolving stages of disease. In such
a ‘cascade model’ of disease [27], the age of onset can not
always be pinpointed straight-forwardly. Whereas the
disease itself (e.g. symptoms of type 2 diabetes) may not
become manifest before adulthood or even old age, cer-
tain risk factors (e.g. overweight) or early stages of disease
(e.g. pre-diabetes) may be present already in youth. Natu-
rally, genetic risk factors are present at conception. Since
the first steps towards disease may already be made
before birth or in early childhood, the notion of onset of
disease could become less clear. In children or minors
who already demonstrate certain risk factors or early
stages of disease, genetic susceptibility testing for these
diseases, even though they have traditionally been consid-
ered late-onset, could arguably be morally acceptable.
1.4 Psychiatric/somatic distinction
There are at least three morally relevant differences
between somatic and psychiatric diseases that may lead to
ethical issues. Firstly, knowledge of genetic risks for psy-
chiatric diseases could “undermine or weaken a person’s
sense of integrity and well-being” even before the appear-
ance of symptoms [28]. Psychiatric diseases can change
patients’ perceptions of the world, their behaviors, desires,
opinions and goals, their relationships, and who they are.
The potentially greater psychological impact of genetic
testing for psychiatric diseases may require a higher poten-
tial for medical benefit and higher standards for genetic
counselling than those used for somatic diseases [28].
Secondly, psychiatric diseases are associated with
stigma to a greater extent than somatic diseases [29,30].
Stigma may lead to social and societal problems, such as
disturbed family or personal relations, or discrimination
at the workplace or in the context of (health) insurance.
The level of stigmatisation varies with the disease and
partly determines the level of psychological and social
risk involved [31]. Genetic susceptibility testing is
thought capable of increasing rather than decreasing
stigma associated with psychiatric diseases [32]. A high
risk of stigma and subsequent psychological harm will
increase the required potential for (medical) benefit as
well as the need for good care and counselling.
Thirdly, it has been suggested that genetic testing
itself or a positive test result may become a self-fulfilling
prophecy, a ‘trigger event’ for the psychiatric disease
tested for [33]. Moreover, the manner in which the dis-
ease is understood by the patient (e.g. “it is in my genes,
therefore it is an inevitable aspect of myself”) is likely to
reflect on and modulate the development of the disease
itself [34]. Thus, genetic testing could have unforeseen
negative effects on the disease itself.
It is important to note here that the psychiatric/
somatic distinction has a somewhat different status than
the other disease characteristics. Modulated by action-
ability and severity, genetic testing for psychiatric dis-
eases may be accompanied by a varying likelihood of
adverse psychological consequences and thus bring the
principle of non-maleficence into play to a varying
extent. This way, disease characteristics may sometimes
combine to lead to ethical issues. They should not be
considered in isolation, but rather with an eye for their
dynamic relations.
In conclusion, there is not yet much experience with
(clinical) genetic testing for psychiatric diseases. Through
personal genome testing, the practice of risk prediction for
psychiatric diseases is currently taking shape, but the field
and its ethical issues are largely unexplored. Due to the
complexities in etiology, and the societal and psychological
sensitivities that surround psychiatric diseases, genetic
testing for such diseases requires a careful approach, with
special attention to ethical issues.
2. Three diseases: how disease characteristics affect the
ethical debate
We have identified four key disease characteristics that
are relevant to the ethical evaluation of susceptibility
testing: severity, actionability, age of onset, and the psy-
chiatric/somatic distinction. In this section, we analyse
how these disease characteristics influence the ethical
issues surrounding susceptibility testing for three multi-
factorial diseases, namely type 2 diabetes, age-related
macular degeneration (AMD) and clinical depression.
These diseases are illustrative of both the disease char-
acteristics and the main ethical issues surrounding sus-
ceptibility testing, whether it be offered in a clinical
setting or directly-to-consumer. Our main question is
whether and on what conditions it would be morally
justifiable to offer individual susceptibility testing to
children and adults. Key elements of the discussion are
summarised in Table 1.
2.1 Type 2 diabetes: variable severity and possibilities for
early preventive intervention
Genetic susceptibility testing services for type 2 diabetes
have already been made available directly-to-consumer
both as targeted tests and as part of non-targeted perso-
nal genome tests [2,35]. While both physicians and
Bunnik et al. BMC Medical Genomics 2012, 5:4
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1755-8794/5/4
Page 4 of 9
consumers have been found to respond favorably to the
idea of direct-to-consumer genetic testing for type 2 dia-
betes susceptibility [36], experts are not convinced of its
current clinical validity and utility [37,38].
Type 2 diabetes is a somatic disease of varying sever-
ity. In its initial stages, it generally causes relatively mild
symptoms, but on the long term, diabetes may cause
kidney failure, blindness and neuropathy of the extremi-
ties, and it may cause premature death. As known non-
genetic risk factors, such as overweight and pre-diabetes,
are increasingly affecting the young [39], type 2 diabetes
can no longer simply be considered a late-onset disease.
There are both therapeutic options and well-established
preventive strategies available for type 2 diabetes, for
children as well as for adults, at the level of lifestyle
improvements.
The variability of the severity of type 2 diabetes poses
difficulties for the ethical evaluation of susceptibility
testing for the disease. From a precautionary perspective,
it could be argued that type 2 diabetes should be viewed
as a severe disease and require high levels of genetic
counselling and psychological support. However, empiri-
cal research has shown that on the short term genetic
susceptibility testing for type 2 diabetes hardly causes
any psychological harm or emotional impact at all
[40,41], thus suggesting that consumers may not experi-
ence increased personal risk for type 2 diabetes as
severe, and that requirements for counselling in order to
prevent psychological harm may be less stringent. There
may be discrepancies between the severity of a disease
as perceived by medical professionals and the severity of
the same disease as perceived by other publics. Ques-
tions regarding standards of severity may be interesting
topics for further (ethical) research.
Further, the existence of preventive options for type 2
diabetes implies a potential for medical benefits to be
obtained from susceptibility testing. Preventive options
consist in general health recommendations, such as a
healthy diet, regular physical exercise, weight loss, and
smoking cessation. As a consequence, if false reassur-
ance occurs, it may lead to harm. Individuals who are
found to be at decreased risk may wrongly feel assured
that they will remain free from disease, regardless of
their lifestyles [42]. They may fail to understand that
general health recommendations are relevant to the
whole of the population, including low-risk subgroups.
Low-risk individuals may ignore these recommendations
and consequently put their health conditions at risk.
The risk of false reassurance should be taken into
account in the consideration of an offer of susceptibility
testing for type 2 diabetes to adults or children.
The actionability of a test is not only a characteristic
of the disease tested for, but is influenced by other fac-
tors, as well, notably the clinical validity of the test. As
preventive measures in type 2 diabetes are identical to
general health recommendations that apply to the entire
population, it follows that it is unclear whether there is
any use for susceptibility testing [37]. The actionability
of susceptibility testing may nonetheless be twofold: it
may motivate high-risk individuals to adhere to general
health recommendations [42] and it may be used to tar-
get preventive strategies, guidance, care and monitoring
by healthcare professionals, at those who are likely to be
most in need. Any clinical utility - any potential for
medical benefit - will only be realised on the condition
of established clinical validity, which today has not been
fulfilled.
Moreover, in the context of a limited or moderate
clinical validity, preventive measures ought not to be
too burdensome or too strongly associated with health
risks, psychological or societal risks. When the benefits
of preventive action are uncertain, the risks should be
minimal in order to assure proportionality. In the case
of type 2 diabetes, preventive measures are likely to be
acceptable to most consumers: they may not always be
easy to adopt, but they do not entail health risks or side
effects. Adequate post-test counselling could help to
improve the implementation of behavior change and
thus actionability.
At the same time, the window of opportunity for pre-
ventive action is expanding at present. Given that child-
hood obesity may not only cause severe morbidity in
Table 1 Disease characteristics and their relation to ethical principles: Ethical issues to consider
Disease
characteristic
Ethical principles Relation characteristic/principle:
Ethical issues to consider
Severity Beneficence
Non-maleficence
High severity ® high potential for medical benefit, high risk of psychological harm
Actionability Beneficence
Non-maleficence
High actionability ® high potential for (medical) benefit
Moderate actionability ® risk of psychological harm (e.g. victim-blaming or feelings of guilt)
Low actionability ® risk of psychological harm (emotional impact of test result)
Age of onset Respect for
autonomy
Late age of onset ® right not to know in adults and children
Psychiatric/somatic Non-maleficence Psychiatric diseases: more risk of harm because of stigma; more risk of harm because of psychological
impact
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the young [43], but is also an independent risk factor for
adult obesity [44] and subsequent diseases (e.g. type 2
diabetes), it may be sensible to start the prevention of
adult obesity or type 2 diabetes already in childhood. It
is still unclear whether and what childhood interven-
tions will prove effective [43,45], and whether genetic
susceptibility testing for type 2 diabetes will gain clinical
validity and will prove to be of added value over and
above clinical risk factors for the identification of at-risk
individuals [38]. If it can be established that early inter-
ventions yield levels of medical benefit that could not be
otherwise attained, and that genetic testing can be useful
for the targeting of interventions at subgroups of high-
risk children, a favourable risk-benefit ration for testing
in childhood might ensue. In that case it could become
rational and morally justifiable to test children for their
genetic susceptibility to type 2 diabetes. This will also
depend on other ethical issues, such as psychological
harms: at-risk children who do not adhere to lifestyle
recommendations and develop the disease later in life
may blame themselves or be blamed by others. Such
‘victim-blaming’ or feelings of guilt will not always be
justified in the context of a multifactorial disease for
which susceptibility testing is of moderate predictive
ability: some at-risk individuals may develop the disease
even if they take appropriate measures, whereas other
at-risk individuals may not fall ill despite their failing to
take preventive action. These risks must be weighed
against the potential medical benefits.
In conclusion, while the age of onset may be difficult
to determine for type 2 diabetes and the disease is
rather severe, it is actionable. There is currently insuffi-
cient evidence to support an offer of genetic susceptibil-
ity testing for type 2 diabetes to children or minors.
Susceptibility tests are presently of insufficient clinical
validity and utility [38] in order to justify such an offer.
For adults, however, it could be argued that in the
absence of clear harms, the potential for benefit need
not be great in order to justify genetic testing, on the
condition, naturally, of adequate ethical safeguards such
as adequate information provision, informed consent,
quality assurance and privacy protection, and provided
the test has a reasonable predictive ability. Stringent
requirements for counselling may not be necessary to
protect against psychological harm, but post-test coun-
selling may be helpful to improve actionability and to
protect against the risk of false reassurance.
2.2 Age-related macular degeneration: very late onset
There have been optimistic reports on the feasibility of
testing for genetic susceptibility to age-related macular
degeneration (AMD) [46,47], and several personal gen-
ome testing services including AMD have already been
put onto the direct-to-consumer market [2,48,49].
Genetic susceptibility tests for AMD are considered to
be of substantial clinical validity, and are expected to
eventually outperform and improve or replace existing
prediction models [50].
AMD is a leading cause of vision loss worldwide [51].
It is a somatic disease of (very) late onset that generally
progresses slowly. Although end-stage AMD may entail
serious vision loss and brings along a fair amount of
morbidity, the disease is not life-threatening. Further-
more, there are treatment options (e.g. laser therapy)
and preventive options (specific vitamin supplements,
smoking cessation, the wearing of sunglasses) available
for AMD [52]. Although the preventive measures are
safe, they do not seem to be very effective [53].
Given the late age of onset and the absence of oppor-
tunities for primary preventive action in childhood or
adolescence, there are no medical reasons for childhood
genetic testing. Therefore, it is preferable to postpone
genetic testing for AMD until maturity, when young
adults can make a more informed and autonomous
decision whether or not to undergo testing and can pro-
vide informed consent. Thus, children’s and minors’
rights not to know their genetic risk can be protected.
As AMD tends not to strike until old age, psychologi-
cal and social risks of genetic testing are likely to remain
limited. Although there are no effective preventive
options, given the availability of treatment options, the
moderate severity and the (very) late onset of the dis-
ease, susceptibility testing for AMD will not give rise to
very many ethical issues in consenting adults. Testing
for AMD may become a morally acceptable practice in
the clinic or on the direct-to-consumer personal genome
testing market, depending largely on the ways in which
further ethical issues are dealt with, such as quality
assurance, information provision and informed consent,
which are beyond the scope of this paper.
2.3 Clinical depression: psychiatric disease, stigma, and
psychological risk
Potential consumers have expressed high interest in
genetic susceptibility testing for clinical depression [54].
They have also indicated to be interested in such testing
for their children [55]. Several companies are offering
susceptibility testing for clinical depression directly-to-
consumer [56,57]. The clinical validity of susceptibility
testing for clinical depression has not been established
[58].
Clinical depression can present itself at any age [52].
While non-genetic risk factors for depression, such as
emotional neglect or negative emotional experiences in
early youth, high stress levels, major life events, and
drug abuse, have been identified, they are notoriously
difficult to avoid. As of yet, no feasible, effective primary
preventive strategies have been established for depres-
sion, neither in children nor in adults. The disease varies
in severity, but is generally considered to be relatively
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severe [52]. For severe diseases, it could be argued, sus-
ceptibility tests are morally required to be of sufficient
clinical validity, because low or moderately predictive
testing for severe diseases would leave the tested indivi-
dual with high degrees of uncertainty in the light of a
fearful medical scenario. This could cause psychological
harm to the patient and so violate the principle of non-
maleficence. Since, as of yet, the level of clinical validity
in susceptibility testing for depression has not proven
sufficient, the ethical acceptability of a testing offer is
not clear.
Companies are increasingly marketing pharmacoge-
nomic testing for drug response directly to consumers,
also in the context of psychiatric diseases [2,59]. One
company is offering a combination of susceptibility test-
ing and pharmacogenomics testing for anti-depressant
response [56]. Such combinations of susceptibility test-
ing and pharmacogenomic testing are a new develop-
ment on the direct-to-consumer genetic testing market.
Theoretically, they may increase the actionability of the
test and decrease the perceived severity of the disease
tested for, and thus bring more benefit and less harm to
individuals than would single susceptibility tests. On the
other hand, however, this development may not be with-
out risk. In the absence of evidence of clinical validity -
and there is no such evidence for pharmacogenomic
testing for antidepressant response [60] - potential for
medical benefit is not likely to materialise. Sensitivities
and risks surrounding genetic testing for psychiatric dis-
eases should be weighed carefully.
It has been hypothesised that susceptibility testing for
psychiatric diseases be made available to children [33].
Children who are tested to be at increased risk could be
provided with ‘pre-symptomatic interventions’ [33], it is
claimed, consisting of advice about avoiding environ-
mental stress, or prophylactic medication. However, in
the absence of feasible primary preventive options, pre-
dictive testing is not likely to yield any medical benefit
for children. Genetic information about psychiatric dis-
eases may have an unknown effect on the child’s “devel-
oping sense of self and future prospects” [31], and may
even become a self-fulfilling prophecy [33]. As long as
clinical validity and utility are lacking, and taking into
account moral considerations such as non-maleficence
and the right not to know, there are no convincing rea-
sons to justify the offering of genetic testing for clinical
depression risk to children or minors.
In conclusion, in addition to its variable age of onset,
relatively high level of severity, and unclear preventive
options, clinical depression is characterised by its psy-
chiatric rather than somatic nature. The disease is
endowed with stigma, and knowledge about one’s sus-
ceptibility may cause psychological risks (see section
1,4). Given the lack of ‘actionability’, genetic testing for
depression may bring more harm than benefit onto per-
sons. As long as uncertainty prevails regarding the psy-
chological implications of genetic susceptibility testing
for psychiatric diseases, a cautious approach may be
warranted, even in consenting adults. More research
into the psychological and social consequences of perso-
nal genome testing for depression and other psychiatric
diseases will be needed.
Summary
We have identified four disease characteristics that are
relevant to discussions on the ethical issues surrounding
genetic susceptibility testing for multifactorial diseases:
severity, age of onset, actionability and the somatic or
psychiatric nature of the disease. These characteristics
are linked to important ethical principles and work
together to affect the ethical debate. For example, the
potential for adverse psychological and social conse-
quences of genetic testing for late-onset diseases (harm)
is greater in the context of diseases that are both severe
and have no actionable options. In such cases testing
poses greater ethical challenges.
As a general ethical rule of thumb, the likelihood and
seriousness of possible harms, including psychological
and social harms, should weigh up against the likelihood
and magnitude of the potential (medical) benefits of
testing. Severity and actionability are therefore relevant
disease characteristics. Moreover, severity, actionability
and the somatic/psychiatric distinction affect the
requirements for good pre- and post test counselling,
such that, for example, genetic susceptibility testing for
psychiatric diseases will require careful psychological
counselling. In children, the right not to know must be
protected, which means that late-onset disease should
not be tested for, unless there is a clear advantage (a
positive benefit-risk ratio) for the child.
We have discussed these disease characteristics and
the resulting ethical issues for three exemplary diseases,
type 2 diabetes, age-related macular degeneration
(AMD) and clinical depression. First, a broader perspec-
tive may be appropriate on the age of onset in type 2
diabetes to encompass accumulating risk factors and
preclinical stages of disease throughout life. Genetic sus-
ceptibility testing for type 2 diabetes may eventually
become acceptable even in children and minors,
depending foremost on the clinical validity of the test,
but also on the actionability of the test result, and on
the manner in which ‘age of onset’ is conceptualised.
Potential for medical benefit must be weighed against
psychological harms and moral wrongs, such as infringe-
ments upon the right not to know. For adults, genetic
susceptibility testing for type 2 diabetes may be accepta-
ble under certain conditions. Second, we have described
AMD as a less severe somatic disease of very late onset.
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We have concluded that not many ethical issues are to
be expected from susceptibility testing for AMD in con-
senting adults, whether within a clinical context or on
the direct-to-consumer market. Third, clinical depres-
sion is understood to be a psychiatric disease with a
variable age of onset, a relatively high level of severity
and unclear actionability. Genetic information on psy-
chiatric diseases is associated with specific ethical issues,
such as stigma and possible adverse psychological conse-
quences, that warrant a very careful consideration of
genetic testing for psychiatric diseases.
As a general conclusion we contend that a critical atti-
tude is needed towards personal genome testing services
that offer ‘packages’ of risk estimates for a multitude of
multifactorial diseases simultaneously, because, as we
have argued, different ethical issues apply to different
diseases, depending on their characteristics. As some
personal genome testing companies are offering genetic
test results for a multitude of diseases that differ from
one another with regard to the disease characteristics
that we have identified [2], consumers are confronted
with test results that vary in emotional impact and thus
pose different requirements for pre- and post-test infor-
mation and counselling. The ethical evaluation of such
broad testing is therefore highly complex. Susceptibility
tests for some diseases, such as AMD, can justifiably be
offered within directly-to-consumer personal genome
testing. For other diseases, on the other hand, it may
not even be morally acceptable to include a genetic sus-
ceptibility test at all, or only on the condition of profes-
sional counselling. Finally, many tests may not be
morally justifiable in the case of children, because of a
late onset of the disease and a lack of actionability.
Further research will be needed in order to establish a
sensible subdivision of those broad ‘packages’ into clus-
ters of diseases with similar characteristics, so as to
allow for parallel ethical evaluations of clusters of sus-
ceptibility tests within a single personal genome test.
Such parallel ethical evaluations should point out what
clusters of tests may or may not justifiably be offered,
and on what conditions.
When whole-genome sequencing becomes widely
accessible to patients and consumers, and yield disease
risks not only for multifactorial diseases but also for
monogenic diseases, these problems are likely to
increase even further. It will not be easy to conduct an
overall ethical evaluation of personal genome testing on
the basis of whole-genome sequencing, or to determine
the appropriate and morally required level of genetic
counselling, care and psychosocial support.
Although other aspects of genetic susceptibility test-
ing, such as the more technical properties of the test or
specific aspects of the context in which testing is
offered, may be equally important to its ethical
evaluation, we think that an understanding of ethically
relevant disease characteristics will prove helpful for
further ethical discussions on genetic susceptibility test-
ing and personal genome testing for multifactorial
diseases.
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